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INTRODUCTION

There are now few written federal or state civil procedure laws
broadly authorizing pre-suit discovery. Yet with the increasing
amounts of electronically stored information (ESI) relevant to future
civil litigation, the regularity of ESI loss/destruction, and the growing
availability of substantive law claims involving pre-suit evidence
spoliation, there is a compelling need for new written laws on pre-suit
court orders involving evidence preservation.
Current written civil procedure laws generally authorize pre-suit
discovery perpetuating witness testimony via depositions in order to
prevent a failure of justice arising because a witness will likely be
unavailable later. Fewer procedural laws authorize pre-suit discovery
aimed at identifying potential defendants or potential causes of action.
Virtually no current civil procedure laws address broader pre-suit
court orders involving evidence preservation. 1 They should, moving
such orders from the "fringes."2
Pre-suit evidence preservation duties generally arise under two
types of laws. One embodies post-lawsuit civil procedure laws on
discovery sanctions for failure to produce evidence that should have
been preserved, but was lost, pre-suit. The other encompasses
substantive law claims for damages arising from pre-suit evidence
losses.
New written civil procedure laws should authorize pre-suit court
orders involving evidence preservation when the requested evidence
is relevant to imminent civil litigation and will likely spoil otherwise.
These new laws should originate in amendments to current written
civil procedure laws on witness testimony perpetuation via deposition
and not the laws on discovery sanctions as suggested by Professor A.
Benjamin Spencer. 3 New laws should authorize information gathering
1. We employ, not unlike civil discovery laws on relevancy, as with FRCP
26(b)(I) where discoverability is not synonymous with admissibility, the phrase
"evidence preservation" to encompass the nonprivileged information and materials
available in civil litigation discovery. See FED. R. CJV. P. 26(b)(I).
2. See generally John Leubsdorf, Fringes: Evidence Law Beyond the
Federal Rules, 51 IND. L. REv. 613 (2018) (noting that outside of civil procedure, as
with evidence, important principles on litigation processes remain on the "fringes").
3. See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Preservation Obligation: Regulating and
Sanctioning Pre-Litigation Spoliation in Federal Court, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2005,

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3350654

Expanding Pre-Suit Discovery

653

during pre-suit discovery, as well as pre-suit orders, declaring a lack
of any preservation duty where a pre-suit evidence preservation
demand has been made, is disputed, and warrants immediate judicial
attention. The availability of more expansive pre-suit orders under
written civil procedure laws will promote greater uniformity among
the trial courts, 4 prompt more informed settlement talks, and enhance
accuracy in later litigation factfinding. s

I. CURRENT CIVIL PROCEDURE LAWS ON PRE-SUIT DISCOVERY
A. Perpetuating Witness Testimony via Deposition and Preserving
Other Evidence

Federal and state civil procedure laws authorizing pre-suit
discovery have several distinct purposes. One purpose, widely
pursued, involves evidence preservation for foreseeable civil actions
via depositions of witnesses who may not be available later. 6 Federal
Civil Procedure Rule (FRCP) 27, substantially replicated in many
states, authorizes testimony perpetuation via deposition "about any
matter cognizable in a United States court" where the "petitioner
expects to be a party to an action" in a U.S. court but "cannot
presently" sue. 7 Under this rule, a deposition can only be ordered to
2022-24 (2011). We respectfully disagree with Professor Spencer's thoughtful
suggestion on adding new pre-suit evidence preservation duties to the general civil
procedure laws on post-suit discovery sanctions.
4. See Joshua M. Koppel, Federal Common Law and the Courts' Regulation
of Pre-Litigation Preservation, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 101, 121 (2012)
(supporting federal court use of state pre-suit discovery standards, especially when
actual or possible state law claims or defenses are in play). We generally support
independent federal judicial rulemaking regarding pre-suit discovery orders
authorized by federal district courts relevant to both federal and state law claims and
defenses.
5. These goals may also be achieved through greater use of equitable bills
of discovery, undertaken in the absence of written discovery laws. See, e.g., Rupert F.
Barron, Annotation, Existence and Nature of Cause of Action for Equitable Bill of
Discovery, 37 A.L.R. 5th 645 (1996) (collecting and analyzing cases since 1950). Our
preference is for written standards guiding judicial discretion. Written laws should
reflect more precisely when pre-suit discovery methods may be used (e.g., only when
a petitioner cannot presently bring a civil action), what discovery methods are
available (e.g., deposition only), and for what purposes they may be employed (e.g.,
only to perpetuate testimony).
6. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 27(a)(l)(A).
7. Id.; see also ALASKA R. CIV. P. 27(a)(l); ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 27(a)(l)(A);
ARK. R. C!v. P. 27(a)(l); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-156a(a)(l)(A) (2019); MISS. CODE
ANN.§ 13-l-227(a)(l) (2019); S.D. CODCFIED LAWS§ 15-6-27(a)(l)(A) (2019); NEB.
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"prevent a failure or delay of justice."8 Through the use of such a
deposition, a prudent petitioner can request that the deponent produce
documents and other tangible things at the deposition or submit to a
physical or mental examination. 9 A deposition to perpetuate testimony
"does not limit a court's power to entertain an action to perpetuate
testimony," a power substantially defined by "the former equitable bill
in equity to perpetuate testimony."I 0 Such a bill predates the FRCP and
is generally read similarly to the current FRCP requirements on
testimony perpetuation. II
An Illinois Supreme Court rule is somewhat similar but different
in important aspects. I2 The rule authorizes testimony perpetuation via
deposition regarding any matter that may be cognizable not only in
any court but also in any proceeding. 13 There is no need under the
Illinois rule to show the petitioner cannot presently sue. I4 One
condition for a pre-suit deposition, fixed by the authorizing court, can
be the production of "documents or tangible things" containing
matters within the scope of the permitted examination. 15
A New York statute on pre-suit evidence preservation orders
differs from the federal and Illinois provisions, as it expressly covers
varying disclosure devices, including depositions, interrogatories,
physical and mental examinations, and requests for admission. I6 A
New Jersey court rule authorizes "[a] person who desires to ...
preserve any evidence or to inspect documents or property or copy
documents" to petition for pre-suit discovery; yet, the petitioner must
be "presently unable to bring" a suit or cause it to be brought. 17
CT. R. DISCOVERY§ 6-327(a)(l)(i); S.C. R. CIV. P. 27(a)(l); w. VA. R. CIV. P.
27(a)(l).
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 27(a)(3).
9. See id. (referencing FED. R. CIV. P. 34 and 35).
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 27(c); Shore v. Acands, 644 F.2d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 1981).
11. See, e.g., Shore, 644 F.2d at 389; see also Lubrin v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp.,
109 F.R.D. 403, 405 (D.V.I. 1986) (most cases find "independent action to obtain
discovery" is similar "to the antiquated instrument called an equitable bill of
discovery").
12. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 217.
13. See id. 217(a)(l).
14. Id.; see also MD. R. 2-404(a)(2); 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 9-18-12 (2019); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 804.02(l)(a)(West 2019).
15. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 204(a)(l).
16. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3102(a), (c) (McKinney 2011) (pre-suit "disclosure to aid
in bringing an action, to preserve information, or to aid in arbitration").
17. N.J. CT. R. 4:11-l(a); see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Borgata Hotel
Casino & Spa, 195 A.3d 538, 542 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2017) (extending N.J.
CT. R. 4: 11-1 to pre-suit petitions to insurance companies of insureds who receive
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Pre-suit witness testimony perpetuation is sometimes addressed
in special laws, which may not differ much from general laws. In
Montana, there is not only a court rule similar to FRCP 27, but there
is also a similar court rule benefitting a "person who desires to
perpetuate testimony regarding the historical beneficial use of any
water right claim." 18 In Missouri, a statute covers pre-suit witness
depositions "to perpetuate testimony" where "the object is to
perpetuate the contents of any lost deed or other instrument of writing,
or the remembrance of any ... matter ... necessary to the recovery
... of any estate or property ... or any other personal right." 19
Beyond certain depositions, written civil procedure laws
generally fail to address pre-suit judicial orders on preserving other
evidence. An equitable bill in discovery occasionally is employed to
preserve other evidence. In 2012 in Chicago, a state trial court ordered,
via an "emergency bill," a medical facility to preserve and release
documents related to the failure by its refrigeration machines to
maintain sperm samples. 20 And after being involuntarily removed
from a United Airlines plane on April 9, 2017, Dr. David Dao secured
from a Chicago trial court, via an "emergency bill," a pre-suit order.2 1
On April 11, 2017, Dr. Dao requested the preservation and protection
of, inter alia, a surveillance video, the passenger and crew lists,
personnel files, the protocol on passenger removal, and all incident
reports. 22 A bill was granted on April 17, 2017, per party agreement. 23
The range of such bills on preserving nondeposition evidence remains
unclear, however. As will soon be demonstrated, Illinois courts do
recognize a common law tort for pre-suit negligent spoliation of
evidence. 24 Yet, that duty seemingly did not arise in the two aforenoted
emergency discovery bill cases.
notices of possible later lawsuits); In re Kemmerer, No. OCN-L-1815-18, 2019 WL
1494788, at* 1, *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2019) (citing In re Hall ex rel. Hall, 688
A.2d 81 (N.J. 1997)).
18. MONT. R. WATER ADJ. R. 28; see MONT. R. Crv. P. 27.
19. Mo. REV. STAT. § 492.420 (1939).
20. See Doe v. Nw. Mem ' !Hosp., 19N.E.3d 178, 184-85 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)
(noting the grant followed an "agreement of the parties"); In Court, CHICAGO DAILY
L. BULL., July 19, 2012, at p. 2, col. 5-6.
21. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-402 (West 2006).
22. See Elliot C. McLaughlin, "Man Dragged Off United Flight Has
Concussion, Will File Suit, Lawyer Says," CNN (Apr. 14, 2017),
https ://www.cnn.com/201 7/04/13/travel/united-passenger-pulled-off-flight-lawsuitfamily-attorney-speak/index.html.
23. See id.
24. See infra Part III.
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B. Identifying Potential Defendants
Less frequent in the United States are written civil procedure
laws authorizing pre-suit discovery seeking to identify potential
defendants. There is no explicit written FRCP. But such discovery is
sometimes available in state trial courts where there are civil actions
already pending, meaning one or some but not all defendants have
been identified. For example, the Illinois statute on respondents in
discovery says that a plaintiff "in any civil action may designate as
respondents in discovery ... those individuals or other entities, other
than the named defendants, believed by the plaintiff to have
information essential to the determination of who should properly be
named as additional defendants in the action." 25 Information can be
secured from non party respondents as from defendants. 26
Other civil procedure laws authorize pre-suit discovery aimed at
identifying potential defendants though there is no pending, related
civil action. In Illinois, beyond the respondent in discovery law, there
is a court rule on an "independent action" pursued by a potential
claimant for "the sole purpose of ascertaining the identity of one who
may be responsible in damages." 27 In New York, a statute authorizes
pre-suit discovery "to aid in bringing an action." 28 In Ohio, a civil
procedure rule allows pre-suit discovery "necessary to ascertain the
identity of a potential adverse party."29
C. Identifying Potential Causes of Action
Related to the laws on identifying potential defendants, there are
some pre-suit civil discovery laws aiding petitioners seeking to

25. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-402.
26. See id.
27. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 224(a)(l).
28. N.Y. Civ. PRACTICE LAW§ 3102(c) (McKinney 2011); see also Lucas v.
Neidlinger, 81 S.E.2d 825, 828 (Ga. 1954) (describing pre-suit discovery where
information "peculiarly within the knowledge" of others).
29. Omo Crv. R. 34(D)(3)(a)--(b); see also Bay EMM Vay Store, Inc., v.
BMW Fin. Servs. N.A., 116 N.E.3d 858, 861 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018) (petitioner must
also be "otherwise unable to bring the contemplated action"); White v. Equity, Inc.,
899 N.E.2d 205, 208 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that the rule may be employed
even where any later claim would be subject to contractual arbitration); Benner v.
Walker Ambulance Co., 692 N.E.2d 1053, 1054 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (explaining
how the rule supplements, and was promulgated in response to a case interpreting, the
statute on pre-suit discovery aimed at identifying potential causes of action).
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identify potential causes of actions. 30 Here potential defendants may
be known, but their roles-if any-in causing harm is unknown and
may not become known without pre-suit discovery (i.e., res ipsa
loquitur scenarios). Illustrative is a Texas Civil Procedure rule
allowing a petition seeking deposition authorization in order "to
investigate a potential claim or suit," including judicial authority
where there is only an "anticipated suit."31 Under this rule a petitioner
must demonstrate that the deposition order "may prevent a failure or
delay of justice" or that "the likely benefit" of the deposition
"outweighs the burden or expense of the procedure. " 32 Authorized
depositions are governed by "the rules applicable to depositions of
non parties in a pending suit. "33 Thus, document or ESI production can
be sought. 34
A New York statute is broader, as it authorizes varying pre-suit
discovery devices, including depositions, interrogatories, physical and
mental examinations, and requests for admission "to aid in bringing
an action."35 An Ohio statute allows "a person claiming to have a cause
of action" who is "unable to file his complaint" without discovery
"from the adverse party" to "bring an action for discovery ... with any
interrogatories . . . that are necessary to procure the discovery
sought. "36
30. See Scott Dodson, Federal Pleading and State Pre-suit Discovery, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 43, 43 (2010) (advocating for greater pre-suit discovery in
order to assist aspiring claimants to secure information needed under heightened
pleading standards); Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Access to Information, Access to
Justice: The Role ofPre-suit Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 217,
217 (2007) (advocating for expanding such laws in order to promote greater access to
justice for those with claims but limited resources).
31. See TEX. R. Crv. P. 202.1 (describing conditions limiting post-lawsuit
depositions can also limit pre-suit depositions); see also In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416,
418 (Tex. 2008) (discussing a statute limiting discovery in health-care lawsuits
(plaintiff must first serve an expert report applicable to pre-suit depositions)).
32. TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.4(a); see also In re Hewlett Packard, 212 S.W.3d 356,
361 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (benefits do not outweigh burdens, especially as trade
secrets were involved).
33. TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.5.
34. See TEX. R. Crv. P. 176.2, 199.3 (stating that a subpoena for oral
deposition can include command to "produce and permit inspection and copying of
designated documents or tangible things"). The history behind the pre-suit discovery
rule in Texas is reviewed in In re Doe, 444 S.W.3d 603, 605--08 (Tex. 2014).
35. N.Y. CIV. PRACTICE LAW § 3102(a), (c) (McKinney 2011); see also
Lucas v. Neidlinger, 81 S.E.2d 825, 827 (Ga. 1954) (allowing pre-suit discovery on
information that is "necessary" and "peculiarly within the knowledge" of others).
36. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.48 (LexisNexis 2019). The statute
"occupies a small niche between an unacceptable 'fishing expedition' and a short and
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D. Post-suit Discovery Sanctions for Pre-suit Evidence Preservation
Failures
Pre-suit evidence preservation duties are commonly enforced
through post-suit discovery sanctions. Thus, federal and state civil
procedure laws, sometimes very generally37 and sometimes quite
specially, 38 recognize possible post-suit discovery sanctions for certain
pre-suit information losses that come to light when relevant
information is not available yet is subject to a timely post-suit
discovery request. 39 Additionally, in the absence of written civil
procedure laws, 40 procedural common law rulings untethered to
statutes sometimes employ inherent power when considering
sanctions for information losses covered by a respondent's duty to
preserve in anticipation of foreseeable litigation. 41 Whether discovery
plain statement of a complaint or a defense." Poulos v. Parker Sweeper Co., 541
N.E.2d 1031, 1034 (Ohio 1989). The statute may be employed even where any later
claim would be subject to contractual arbitration. See White v. Equity, Inc., 899
N.E.2d 205, 211 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).
37. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c) (providing sanctions against parties who
unreasonably refuse to comply with discovery rules); see also Shimanovsky v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 692 N.E.2d 286, 290 (Ill. 1998) ("[A] potential litigant owes a duty to
take reasonable [pre-suit] measures to preserve the integrity of relevant and material
evidence.").
38. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (providing sanctions when unavailable ESI
"cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery" though it "should have
been preserved in the anticipation ... of litigation"); see also WYO. R. Crv. P. 37(e).
Under FRCP 37(e), available sanctions vary dependent upon whether the lost
evidence arose from negligent or grossly negligent conduct rather than bad faith acts.
See Schmalz v. Viii. ofN. Riverside, No. 13 C 8012, 2018 WL 1704109, at *6 (N.D.
Ill., Mar. 23, 2018).
39. See TENN. C1v. P.R. 34A.Ol (stating that before expert testing that will
materially alter relevant evidence, a "party" shall seek a court order and sanctions can
follow for an "offending party"). Sometimes discovery sanction laws exclusively
speak to post-suit information losses. See id.
40. See Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng. & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363,
368 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that Rule 37 only permits sanctions for violations of an
"order"). At times, written laws will be narrowly read, as when they include only
certain sanctionable conduct. See id.
41. See, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors. Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir.
2001) (discussing federal court inherent power to sanction for pre-suit evidence
spoliation); see also Adkins v. Wolever, 554 F.3d 650, 652 (6th Cir. 2009) (en bane)
(noting that earlier circuit panel rulings applied state law to sanctions for pre-suit loss
or destruction of evidence in federal question cases); Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp.,
427 F.3d 939, 944 (l lth Cir. 2005) ("[F]ederal law governs the imposition of
spoliation sanctions" in a diversity case); Fines v. Ressler Enters., Inc., 820 N.W.2d
688, 690 (N.D. 2012) (discussing when state court inherent power is utilized to
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sanctions flow from written laws or common law rulings, possible
sanctions typically include default judgments or claim dismissals, 42 as
well as adverse jury instructions. 43
These duties on pre-suit evidence preservation prompting postsuit sanctions sometimes reflect certain of Professor Spencer's
suggestions. His proposal speaks to the reasonable anticipation of a
pending civil action when the evidence was lost, wherein a "party" can
be sanctioned in a civil action if that party earlier received an evidence
preservation request from another party no more than sixty days before
the commencement of the action. 44 His proposal also speaks to a presuit preservation duty when there is reasonable anticipation of a
pending civil action by a later party because that party had notice of
events prompting a possible claim and of "resulting harm of sufficient
magnitude to make related litigation probable."45 Finally, Professor
Spencer suggests that a pre-suit evidence preservation duty, which
upon breach can result in a discovery sanction in a pending civil
action, encompasses circumstances where the party "took steps in
anticipation of asserting or defending against a claim in the pending
action" or where there was "a statutory or regulatory duty to
preserve. " 46

sanction a party for pre-suit evidence spoliation); Tatham v. Bridgestone Ams.
Holding, Inc., 473 S.W.3d 734, 740-46 (Tenn. 2015).
42 . See FED. R. C!V. P. 37 (b)(2)(A)(v)-(vi), (e); see also WYO. R. Crv. P.
37(e)(2)(C) (stating that a possible sanction involving unrestorable and irreplaceable
ESI could be to "dismiss .. . or enter a default judgement"); WYO. R. C1v. P.
37(b)(2)(A)(v)-(vi) (stating that possible sanctions involving restorable ESI and nonESI are dismissal or default judgment).
43. See FED. R. C!V. P. 37(e); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i) (stating that the
court can order that facts "be taken as established"); WYO. R. Crv. P. 37(e)(2)(B)
(stating that the court can instruct the jury that it "may or must" presume information
was unfavorable to the party being sanctioned regarding unrestorable and
irreplaceable ESI); WYO. R. Crv. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i) (discussing sanctions involving
restorable ESI and non-ES!); see also Wackenhut Corp. v. Gutierrez, 453 S.W.3d 917,
921 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) (holding that spoliation jury instructions will be
inappropriate where a failure to preserve did not deprive a litigant of a meaningful
ability to present a claim or defense).
44. See Spencer, supra note 3, at 2022-23 (discussing proposed amendments
FRCP 37(e)(l)(C)(ii) and 37(e)(2)(B)).
45. Id. at 2023 (citing FED. R. Clv. P. 37(e)(l)(C)(ii) and quoting FED. R. Crv.
P. 37(e)(2)(C)).
46. Id. (citing FED. R. Crv. P. 37(e)(l)(C)(ii) and quoting FED. R. Crv. P.
37(e)(l)(C)(iii), (D)). Quite sensibly, a civil procedure law on sanctioning evidence
losses can be employed when there is a breach of a substantive law duty on evidence
preservation.
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Procedural laws on pre-suit evidence preservation duties
germane to post-suit discovery sanctions do not always follow
substantive law pre-suit evidence preservation duties that can lead to
money damage claims. Borrowing from Robert Frost, an Appellate
Court described one harmed by spoliated evidence as confronting
"two roads diverged in a wood," wherein the elements for pursuing a
discovery sanction differ from the elements for pursuing a substantive
law claim involving evidence spoliation.47 Post-suit discovery
sanctions for pre-suit evidence preservation failures can be authorized
generally or can be addressed in special discovery sanction laws. 48
1. General Sanctioning Authority
FRCP 3 7 generally authorizes sanctions for the failure to
produce certain lost ESI (like restorable or replaceable ESI), as well
as for the failure to produce lost non-ESI (like paper documents), that
should have been preserved in anticipation of litigation. 49 Guidelines
for sanctions involving nonrestorable and nonreplaceable ESI differ
from sanctions authorized for lost but replaceable ESI and for lost nonESl, 50 as do the guidelines on the types of culpability necessary for
finding discovery violations. 51 A number of states have comparable
general civil procedure discovery laws. 52 Other state courts employ
47. See Adams v. Bath & Body Works, Inc., 830 N.E.2d 645, 652 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2005) (finding sanction of dismissal requires deliberate or contumacious conduct
or "unwarranted disregard of the court's authority" while a spoliation of evidence
claim in tort "requires mere negligence" ( quoting Shimanovsky v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
692 N.E.2d 286, 291 (111. 1998))).
48. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
49. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b) (failure to comply with a court order); FED. R.
C1v. P. 37(c) (failure to disclose, to supplement an earlier discovery response, or to
admit); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d) (failure to attend a deposition, to serve answers to
interrogatories, or to respond to a request for inspection).
50. See FED. R. C1v. P. 37(e) (covering only irreplaceable or nonrestorable
ESI and expressly mentioning only four possible sanctions); see also FED. R. Crv. P.
37(b)(2) (recognizing a broader category of possible sanctions (including staying
proceedings, specific evidentiary bars, and striking only portions of pleadings) for
lost, but replaceable or restorable ESI, and for lost non-ESI).
51. See FED. R. C1v. P. 37(e). While FRCP 37(e) distinguishes between
intentional and unintentional discovery failures involving nonrestorable and
nonreplaceable ESI, FRCP 37(b) speaks generally to failures to obey court orders on
discovery involving other ESI and non-ESI without differentiating between the types
of culpability. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b), (e).
52. See, e.g., WYO. R. Clv. P. 37; see also D.C. SUP. Cr. R.C.P. 37; Vr. C1v.
P.R. 37 (including only the initial portion ofFED.R. C1v. P. 37(e) so it does not speak
to intentional acts).
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laws that fail to distinguish between some ESI and other ESI, or
between ESI and non-ESI. 53
2. Special Sanctioning Authority
Post-suit discovery sanctions may also follow violations of
special, or explicit, pre-suit evidence preservation duties. As just
noted, a FRCP and some state laws now speak to the consequences of
failing to produce during discovery a certain form of "lost" ESI that
"should have been preserved in the anticipation . . . of litigation. "54
This form involves ESI that "cannot be restored or replaced through
additional discovery." 55 Sanctions, only available where there is
prejudice to another party, normally encompass solely "measures no
greater than necessary to cure the prejudice." 56 However, when the
evidence loss resulted from a party's actions intended "to deprive
another party of the information's use in the litigation," more
significant sanctions are possible. 57
An earlier section of the same FRCP also spoke specifically to
ESI. That section, now operative in some states, 58 only directed that
"[a]bsent exceptional circumstances," no discovery sanctions should
follow failures to provide ESI "as a result of the routine, good-faith
operation of an electronic information system." 59 This allows courts
53. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219. A2014 Committee Comment declared that
the rule "is sufficient to cover sanction issues as they relate to electronic discovery."
54. FED. R. Crv. P. 37(e). An early proponent of such a special ESI rule was
Martin H. Redish. See Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation
Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 608 (2001) (suggesting a conditional cost-shifting rule);
see also Stanley Richards, The False Promise of Proposed Rule 37(E): Why It Will
Not End Data Producers' Over-Preservation Habits, 32:2 YALE L. & POL'Y. REV.
INTER ALIA 34, 38-41 (2014) (providing a critique of the current special ESI rule,
written when it was being considered).
55. FED. R. Crv. P. 37(e).
56. FED. R. Crv. P. 37(e)(l).
57. FED. R. Crv. P. 37(e)(2) (such sanctions include a presumption that the
lost information was unfavorable, a jury instruction embodying an unfavorable
presumption, a dismissal, and a default judgment); see also Wai Feng Trading Co. v.
Quick Fitting, Inc., No. 13-33WES, 2019 WL 118412, at *7 (D.R.I. Jan. 7, 2019)
(containing significant review of the rule).
58. See, e.g., ME. R. Crv. P. 37(e); see also TENN. R. Crv. P. 37.06(2); N.D.
R. Crv. P. 37(t). Ohio Civil Procedure Rule 37(e) is comparable but goes on to
elaborate on the factors to be used in determining whether to impose sanctions. See
OmoR. Crv. P. 37(e).
59. FED. R. Crv. P. 37(e). See generally Jeffrey A. Parness, Lost ES/ Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 SMU Ser. & TECH. L. REV. 25 (2017)
(explaining the history behind the ESI sanction rule changes in 2015).
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more discretion in determining where sanctions are appropriate. 60 But
it fails to discourage adequately the disposal of information important
to later foreseeable litigation that could be very easily and
inexpensively retained.
A current special Arizona discovery rule on pre-suit ESI
preservation contains some elements of both the former and current
FRCP sections on pre-suit ESI preservation. 61 Rather than the
"exceptional circumstances" prescribed under the former federal rule,
the Arizona rule authorizes sanctions for failing to take "reasonable
steps" to preserve ESI that is destroyed due to the "routine operation"
of an ESI system or of an "application of a document retention
policy."62 Additionally, preservation of information is explicitly
required when one "reasonably anticipates an action's
commencement" wherein one would be either a defendant or a
plaintiff. 63 Like the current FRCP, the Arizona rule comparably
addresses sanctions for lost ESI that cannot be "restored or replaced. " 64
Unlike the current FRCP, the Arizona rule sets out factors relevant to
inquiries into "reasonable steps to preserve relevant" ESI. 65
II. INADEQUATE DISCOVERY LAWS ON PRE-SUIT EVIDENCE
PRESERVATION ORDERS
For now, there are generally no written civil procedure laws
authorizing pre-suit discovery aimed at evidence preservation where
the potential defendants and causes of action are known and where
those pursued for information pre-suit will likely be available for postsuit discovery. This Article posits that pre-suit evidence production
and maintenance orders should be available against those who owe
duties to the petitioners, whether via criminal laws, civil procedure
discovery laws on sanctionable conduct, regulatory record retention
laws, and/or contract and where there is a very good chance that the
duties will be breached, resulting in harm to the petitioners. As well,
there are generally no written civil procedure laws authorizing pre-suit
60. See Mont. State Univ.-Bozeman v. Mont. First Judicial Dist. Court, 426
P.3d 541, 559 (Mont. 2018) (utilizing rule founded on the earlier version of FRCP
37(e) and finding the sanction of a default judgment constituted an abuse of
discretion).
61. See ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 37(g).
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 37(g)(l)(A), (C)(i).
63. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 37(g)(l)(B).
64. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 37(g)(2).
65. ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 37(g)(l)(C)(ii).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3350654

Expanding Pre-Suit Discovery

663

protective orders on behalf of those receiving evidence preservation
demands who successfully urge they have no evidence preservation
duties, but there should be.
An Arizona court rule, effective July 2018, does authorize
certain pre-suit evidence preservation orders that are not aimed at
perpetuating witness testimony or at identifying potential defendants
or potential causes of action. 66 Rather, it speaks to judicial
determinations on "the existence or scope of any duty to preserve"
ESI. 67 The rule permits discovery orders directed at those against
whom there is no "anticipated litigation."68 It also allows one in receipt
of a "preservation request" concerning information relevant to
"anticipated litigation" to petition for a pre-suit order determining the
"existence or scope" of any ESI preservation duty. 69 Yet the rule
requires that petitions regarding the ESI preservation duties of
nonparties occur in a "pending action in which the request is made," 70
not unlike the aforenoted Illinois statute on nonparty respondents in
discovery where a pending civil action is required. 71
Written civil procedure laws should go much further. They
should authorize pre-suit discovery orders, or discovery immunity,
concerning evidence where there is no preexisting legal duty. Such a
duty could be deemed to arise simply from a pre-suit request to
preserve and/or produce information. Civil procedure laws should not
go as far as to authorize pre-suit evidence preservation discovery
based solely on an information request that is denied or that goes
unaddressed. Requests for information alone should not prompt
evidence preservation responsibilities.
Pre-suit civil discovery laws originate in varying sources,
including court rules, statutes, and case precedents. These laws can be
general or special. General laws are exemplified by the broad array of
federal and state civil procedure rules on pre-suit testimony
perpetuation accomplished through depositions of those likely to be
unavailable later. Special duties are illustrated by the Florida statutory
66. ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 45.2(e).
67. Id.
68. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 45.2(b)(l).
69. ARiz. R. CIV. P. 45.2(b)(l), (e)(l). Rule 45.2(e) petitions need not be
preceded by "meet and confer" consultations. See ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 45.2(e); see also
ARIZ. R. C1v. P 16(b)(l); (c)(8)(B)(xiii).
70. ARIZ. R. C1v. P 45.2(b)(2); see also ARIZ. R. CIV. P 26(c)(l) (explaining
that protective orders sought by a nonparty to whom an ESI preservation request is
made to be sought "in the court in the county where the action is pending").
71. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402 (2006).
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provisions on pre-suit discovery involving later medical negligence
claims and defenses. 72 Thus, possible new pre-suit evidence
preservation laws may come from a variety of lawmakers.
Possible new laws may speak only to certain evidence, like
irreplaceable or nonrestorable ESL Some current civil procedure laws,
as noted, already differentiate between certain ESI, other ESI and nonESI.73 Other possible new laws may speak to a broader array of
evidence, including all forms of both ESI and non-ESL
In crafting new pre-suit discovery laws, preemption issues can
arise. One recurring issue can be whether new written pre-suit civil
discovery laws supersede, or merely supplement, earlier case
precedents, like those on equitable bills in discovery. Written laws
sometimes now obliquely reference the continuing vitality of case
precedents, for example, by recognizing the continuing availability of
"an action" or an "independent action" seeking discovery. 74 Other
current laws are silent about their effects. 75 Any new written discovery
laws on pre-suit evidence preservation orders should be clear about
the continuing vitality of earlier precedents and the roles of earlier and
related statutes and rules. Certainly, new written laws on pre-suit
evidence preservation/production can be exclusive, thus preempting
earlier laws-whether written or common law.
Before further exploring the needed expansions of laws on presuit evidence preservation orders, the Article first reviews current
substantive law claims for pre-suit evidence loss. 76 Such substantive
law claims, together with the earlier noted civil procedure laws on
post-suit sanctions for pre-suit evidence losses, should primarily
provide the foundations for any new written laws on pre-suit evidence
preservation orders. 77 Because the substantive as well as the post-suit
procedural laws now vary between U.S. jurisdictions, we anticipate
that any new pre-suit evidence preservation laws might vary between

72. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(6)(a) (2013) ("Upon receipt by a prospective
defendant of a notice of claim, the parties shall make discoverable information
available without formal discovery.").
73. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2), (e).
74. See FED. R. Crv. P. 27(c); FLA. R. C1v. P. l.290(c) (governing pre-suit
depositions to perpetuate testimony); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 224(a) (promulgating rules for
pre-suit discovery by "[a] person or entity" seeking to ascertain "the identity of one
who may be responsible in damages").
75. See CONN. GEN. STAT.ANN.§ 52-156a(West2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 15-6-27(a) (2019); ALASKA R. C!V. P. 27; ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 27; Mo. R. Crv. P. 2-404.
76. See infra Part III.
77. See supra Part I (discussing existing laws on post-suit sanctions).
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jurisdictions. 78 Yet variations cause difficulties, as in choice of law
settings and with lawyer uncertainties regarding how current conduct
will later be assessed. Our hope is that new written pre-suit evidence
preservation laws will be largely comparable, reducing such
difficulties.
III. SUBSTANTIVE LAW CLAIMS FOR PRE-SUIT EVIDENCE
SPOLIATION

Several states recognize claims for evidence spoliation involving
loss or unavailability of information that results in harms involving
diminished or eliminated opportunities to present civil claims or
defenses. 79 Such claims may arise from general or special laws. Often,
such claims are recognized in common law precedents. 80 Significant
interstate variations exist, including differences on who owes an
evidence preservation duty; the manner in which such a duty is
breached; and the available remedy upon breach. 81 The following

78. See supra Part I (noting that federal and state civil procedure laws vary
in scope and sanctions).
79. Compare Hibbits v. Sides, 34 P.3d 327 (Alaska 2001) (recognizing
intentional third-party spoliation as a tort that could be pursued against a state trooper
by motorcycle riders hurt by a pickup truck driver who collided with them, where
trooper-first on the scene--removed the driver for about two hours after the collision
because the trooper knew the driver was under the influence of marijuana), with
Ortega v. City of New York, 876 N.E.2d 1189 (N.Y. 2007) (declining to create
intentional or negligent spoliation tort claims against a city that sold a vehicle it was
ordered to preserve so that future claimants could use it in a later suit against the
vehicle manufacturer). We recognize there may be, but do not address, implied causes
of action for evidence spoliation against prosecutors pursued by those criminally
accused. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) ("(U]nless a criminal
defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially
useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law."); State v. DeJesus,
395 P.3d 111, 124 (Utah 2017) (reaffirming precedent on state constitutional due
process obligation of prosecutors to preserve evidence, which requires "a reasonable
probability that (the] lost evidence would have been exculpatory" and, if so found, a
balancing of the culpability of the State and the prejudice to the defendant in order to
determine an appropriate remedy).
80. See, e.g., Ortega, 876 N.E.2d at 1193 (recognizing claims for spoliation
of evidence arise in common law precedents).
81. While there are interstate differences, at least for corporations there are a
useful set of guiding principles on organizational practices regarding record
disposition. See The Sedona Conference, Commentary on Defensible Disposition, 20
SEDONA CONF. J. 179, 195-98 (2019).
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review of current U.S. state laws employs Illinois policies to compare,
categorize, and explore the varying state approaches. 82
Prelawsuit evidence preservation duties, prompting substantive
law claims, usually in tort, 83 on behalf of those harmed by evidentiary
losses, are described in the Boyd case in Illinois as follows:
The general rule is that there is no duty to preserve evidence; however, a
duty to preserve evidence may arise through an agreement, a contract, a
statute ... or another special circumstance. Moreover, a defendant may
voluntarily assume a duty by affirmative conduct. In any of the foregoing
instances, a defendant owes a duty of due care to preserve evidence if a
reasonable person in the defendant's position should have foreseen that the
evidence was material to a potential civil action. 84

These duties are only somewhat akin to the duties under Illinois
civil procedure laws to have evidence available when requested via
formal discovery, including duties to preserve before civil litigation
commences. 85
82. See Steven Plitt & Jordan R. Plitt, A Jurisprudential Survey ofthe Tort of
Spoliation of Evidence: Resolving Third-Party Insurance Company Automobile
Spoliation Claims, 24 CONN. INS. L.J. 63, 70--71 (2017). To date, Article III federal
courts have not generally recognized substantive federal law claims grounded on
evidence spoliation. See Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir.
2001); Lombard v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 13 F. Supp. 2d 621, 627 (N.D. Ohio 1998)
(finding no federal claim, though there was a violation of federal regulation on record
retention).
83. At times, duties regarding information maintenance may also be
undertaken through contract, as with employees who are required, as a condition of
employment, to provide confidential information to their employers. See, e.g.,
Dittman v. UPMC, 196 A.3d 1036, 1057 (Pa. 2018) (Saylor, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (finding information maintenance claims against employers
can sound in both tort and contract, presenting a hybrid scenario).
84. Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 270-71 (Ill. 1995) (internal
citations omitted). Similar descriptions appear in other state court precedents. See
Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 569 (W. Va. 2003) (first quoting Boyd, then
adopting both a negligent and intentional tort claim for evidence spoliation by a
nonparty, but only an intentional tort claim for evidence spoliation by an adverse
party); Oliver v. Stinson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 19 (Mont. 1999) (first quoting
Boyd, then recognizing both a negligent and intentional tort claim for evidence
spoliation).
85. See, e.g., Shimanovsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 692 N.E.2d 286, 290 (Ill.
1998) (if trial court could not "sanction a party for the presuit destruction of evidence,
a potential litigant could circumvent discovery rules or escape liability simply by
destroying the proof'). Remedies for breaches of evidence preservation duties vary
depending upon whether the duties arose under tort law or civil procedure laws on
discovery. For example, sanctions involving adverse jury instructions may only be
rendered post-suit and arise solely under civil procedure laws. Pre-suit information
preservation duties differ from pre-suit information maintenance duties. See, e.g.,
Dittman, 196 A.3d at 1043, 1047-48 (duty owed by employer to employees "to
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Breaches of substantive pre-lawsuit evidence preservation duties
may be addressed in at least two different ways: through a claim for
spoliation, which often will be presented and heard concurrently with
the underlying suits in which the lost or destroyed evidence would
have been relevant, 86 or through the imposition of a formal discovery
sanction. 87
A. Common Law Tort Law Claims

Common law torts, as per Boyd, involving evidence spoliation
can arise through a "special circumstance" or through a voluntary
assumption of a preservation duty "by affirmative conduct."88 A
special circumstance may involve a fiduciary or otherwise special
relationship between parties where future civil litigation is reasonably
anticipated. 89 Relevant relationships, where there are no explicit
exercise reasonable care" to safeguard the employees' sensitive personal data when
the employers collect and store it "on its internet-accessible computer system").
86. See Parness, supra note 59, at 39; see also FED. R. C1v. P. 37(e) (the
advisory committee's note to the 2015 amendment, described earlier, recognizing that
the discovery sanction rule was not intended to "affect the validity of an independent
tort claim for spoliation if state law applies in a case and authorizes the claim").
87. In a federal district court, the inherent power of the court can be employed
to address pre-suit evidence spoliation, as in Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., 271
F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001) (involuntary dismissal of lawsuit was not an unduly
harsh sanction arising from a discovery failure involving the failure to preserve a car).
In Illinois, the inherent power of the court can be found under Supreme Court Rule
219(c). See, e.g., Peal v. Lee, 933 N.E.2d 450, 457-58 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (stating
there are possible sanctions for discovery noncompliance involving spoliation of
electronic evidence include adverse inference instructions to the jury and involuntary
dismissals with prejudice).
88. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 270-71. Similar common law torts can be pursued
outside of Illinois where the Boyd rationale is followed. See Oliver, 993 P.2d at 1920; Hannah, 584 S.E.2d at 569-70.
89. See Oliver, 993 P.2d at 20 (explaining the duty to preserve evidence may
arise against third-party spoliator "based upon a contract ... or some other special
circumstance/relationship") (citing Johnson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n., 79 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 234, 239-41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)); Cooper v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (insured sued insurer for promissory
estoppel or voluntary assumption of duty when insurer destroyed tire it examined that
was needed by insured for its later product liability suit, where a promise to safeguard
was made by the insurer). Determinations of such special circumstances can be
challenging. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Lyman, 903 F.3d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 2018) (owner
of LLC that was represented by a lawyer was owed no duty of care by the lawyer as
long as owner was not "a direct and intended beneficiary" of the legal representation).
Comparably, a "special relationship of trust and confidence" in an otherwise "ordinary
business" relationship can prompt a duty to disclose "material information." BAS
Broad., Inc. v. Fifth Third Bank, 110 N.E.3d 171, 175 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018).
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agreements or contracts on evidence preservation in play, can include
insurer-insured and attorney-client relationships. 90 Here, information
germane to a future case may not be procured or preserved by an
insurer or an attorney or a doctor, resulting in harm to an insured or a
client or a patient in a later anticipated case. 91 Similarly, a special
circumstance could arise when an expert, retained by a future litigant
without an explicit agreement on evidence preservation, loses
information passed to the expert for analysis. Yet for insurers,
attorneys, doctors, and experts, there seemingly may be few such
spoliation claims pursued, since related claims seemingly can be
founded on implicit or explicit duties involving agreements or
contracts, like duties to defend, represent, treat, or test only in
reasonable fashions.
Affirmative conduct prompting a preservation duty may involve
the assumption of control over evidence that is reasonably foreseeable
as (quite) important to later litigation. Such a duty might be extended
to those who are not in a fiduciary or otherwise special relationship
with the litigant harmed by evidence spoliation. 92 Consider, for
example, an expert retained by one future litigant to conduct evidence
testing, who destroys or significantly alters the evidence during testing
so that the consulting litigant's future adversary has no opportunity to
test independently or to observe the expert's testing. 93 The one-time
future adversary, now involved in litigation with the party who
retained the expert, may have an evidence spoliation claim against the
expert.
Consider, as well, a future litigant's insurance adjuster who takes
possession of, and then negligently loses or intentionally destroys,
important potential evidence so that the litigant's future adversary
later has no access. The one-time future adversary, now in litigation

90. See, e.g., Reynolds, 903 F.3d at 696.
91. See, e.g., Foster v. Lawrence Mem'l Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831, 838 (D.
Kan. 1992) (spoliation claim against treating physician founded on a regulatory duty
to maintain medical records, Kan. Admin. Regs. § 100-24-1 (1998)); Longwell v.
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. I, 970 So. 2d 1100, 1106 (La. Ct. App. 2007).
92. See generally Elliot-Thomas v. Smith, 110 N.E.3d 1231 (Ohio 2018)
(recognizing no such duty for a lawyer to the lawyer's client's adversary, at least
where evidence was concealed, but not destroyed, by the lawyer).
93. Once civil litigation is pending, there are some written laws on the need
to notify, and perhaps include, an adversary when expert testing ofrelevant evidence
is planned. See, e.g., TENN. R. CIV. P. 34A.Ol.
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with the insured, may have an evidence spoliation claim against the
current adversary's insurer. 94
Finally, consider a governmental officer or agency who takes
information and then loses it to the detriment of another involved in
later litigation with the evidence supplier. A torts claim statute or
comparable law might place the government in a similar position to a
private party who spoils evidence. 95
Where a common law duty to preserve is established and is not
dependent upon an agreement or contract, whether through a "special
circumstance" or "affirmative conduct," an evidence spoliation tort
can require proof of culpability going beyond mere negligence. 96 The
94. Compare Dardeen v. Kuehling, 821 N.E.2d 227 (Ill. 2004) (explaining
why an insurer, who told insured homeowner she could remove bricks in an allegedly
hazardous sidewalk, had no liability to pedestrian who had earlier fallen), with Jones
v. O'Brien Tire & Battery Serv. Ctr., Inc., 871 N.E.2d 98 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (finding
driver's insurer potentially liable to the insured 's joint tortfeasor for failure to preserve
wheels from driver's car after driver's insurer settled with a tort victim who later sued
the insured's joint tortfeasor; driver's insurer had voluntarily undertaken control of
wheels for its own benefit and should have anticipated possibility of future litigation),
and Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ill. 1995) (holding an
employer's workers' compensation insurer owed duty to preserve space heater that it
took possession of and that was involved in a workplace accident, where employee
pursued product liability claim against manufacturer of heater).
95. See, e.g., Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463 (Alaska
1986) (stating that one who is arrested has a common law claim "in tort for intentional
interference with prospective civil action [caused] by [the] spoilation of evidence[,]"
here, the alteration of an arrest tape); see also Nichols v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
6 P.3d 300, 303-04 (Alaska 2000) (holding there is no first-party or third-party
evidence spoliation claim founded on negligence, where first-party alleged spoliators
were defined as the parties to the original action). But see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)
(2012) (stating the tort claims act does not apply to claims of"malicious prosecution,
abuse of process ... deceit, or interference with contract rights"). A statute, court rule,
or inherent power precedent on civil procedure sanctions often does not distinguish
between private and public officer conduct, or between private and public entity
conduct. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 11, 16(f), 37 (containing no reference to any
private/public distinction in varying sanction settings).
96. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 270-71; see, e.g., Willis v. Cost Plus, Inc., No. 16639, 2018 WL 1319194 (W.D. La. 2018) (while the Louisiana Supreme Court has
held there is "no cause of action ... for negligent spoliation[,]" lower Louisiana state
courts have recognized a Louisiana claim for spoliation based on intentional conduct
(quoting Reynolds v. Bordelon, 172 So. 3d 589, 592 (La. 2015)). But see Richardson
v. Sara Lee Corp., 847 So. 2d 821 (Miss. 2003) (finding no negligence or intentional
tort claim for spoliation of evidence). Similarly, a civil procedure law sanction for
pre-suit evidence spoliation may only be available if intentional misconduct is shown.
See, e.g., Tatham v. Bridgestone Ams. Holding, Inc., 473 S.W.3d 734, 745-46 (Tenn.
2015) (altering earlier laws by declaring that "intentional misconduct is not a
prerequisite" for spoliation sanctions any longer); see also Mont. State Univ.-
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requisite degree of proof can be dependent upon whether the duty was
owed by one who is or could have been an adverse party in the civil
litigation wherein the lost information would have been employed. 97
Finally, even where the necessary degree of culpability is established,
liability may vary depending upon whether the evidence was
intentionally destroyed or only intentionally concealed. 98
B. Common Law Agreement/Contract Claims
Agreement and contract duties operate differently than tort law
duties for pre-suit evidence preservation. The intentions of the
agreeing or contracting parties-rather than the hypothesized actions
of the reasonable persons-are key. Seemingly, there can be instances
where there are both tort and agreement or contract claims involving
the same spoiled evidence. 99
Bozeman v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 426 P.3d 541, 553-54 (Mont. 2018) (explaining
that intentional evidence spoliation prompts a rebuttable presumption that evidence
was materially unfavorable to spoliating party, while negligent spoliation does not).
97. See, e.g., Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 573-74 (W. Va. 2003)
(holding there was no negligent spoliation claim against adverse party, but a negligent
spoliation claim against a third-party who could not otherwise be an adverse party,
since only the former can be sanctioned under discovery laws; intentional evidence
spoliation is a stand-alone tort available against both an adverse party and a third
party). Compare Oliver v. Stinson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 17, 20 (Mont. 1999)
(recognizing possible negligent spoliation of evidence tort by employee against
employer who could not otherwise be sued, due to Workers' Compensation Act, for
employment injuries though equipment manufacturer could be sued; request to
preserve may have been made and, if it was, employer did not need to offer to pay
reasonable costs of preservation), and MetLife Auto & Home v. Joe Basil Chevrolet,
Inc., 807 N.E.2d 865, 868 (N.Y. 2004) (discussing how a homeowner might be able
to sue car owner's insurer for spoliation, but seemingly would need to submit a written
(not just oral) preservation request and to volunteer to cover the costs associated with
preservation), with Nichols, 6 P.3d at 304 (explaining that intentional spoliation claim
by neighbor against homeowner/tortfeasor's insurer and against homeowner), and
Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 773 N.E.2d 420, 427-28 (Mass. 2002)
(discussing that no negligent evidence spoliation tort by tenant against a landlord's
insurer or against an expert retained by that insurer).
98. See, e.g., Elliott-Thomas v. Smith, 110 N.E.3d 1231, 1235 (Ohio 2018)
(explaining the tort of intentional evidence spoliation extends to destroyed, but not
concealed, evidence).
99. For example, a contractual duty of an insurer to preserve evidence
reasonably necessary in an insured's later defense of an action seeking damages
beyond policy limits may arise in settings where there are also independent
preservation duties in tort owed by the insurer to the insured or to one harmed by the
insured. See, e.g., Silhan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (N.D. Fla.
2002) (discussing circumstances allowing recognition of tort or contract claims by
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The Boyd court did not elaborate on what, if any, differences
arise between evidence preservation claims founded on agreements
and on contracts. Perhaps the two are synonymous. Or perhaps one
evidence preservation claim encompasses a pact made in anticipation
of a possible lawsuit or during a lawsuit, to be guided by civil
procedure laws. Comparable pacts include, for example, matters like
forum selection, choice of law, and jury trial waiver. If so, the other
evidence preservation claim encompasses a pact unrelated to litigation
but related to the need or desire to access earlier developed materials,
as perhaps with tax preparation, medical, or educational records. Here
the pacts would more likely be guided by substantive contract laws,
not civil procedure laws, though such spoliation could be the basis for
evidence preservation disputes and sanctions in civil litigation.
C. Statutory Claims
Beyond common law tort and agreement or contract claims
untethered to statutes, or other written laws like agency regulations or
court rules, under Boyd there may be substantive law claims for
violations of statutes on pre-suit evidence preservation. Such statutes
can expressly recognize a claim for harm resulting from lost evidence.
Statutory evidence preservation duties operating pre-suit can be read
to prompt causes of action. Claims are found where statutes
prohibiting certain conduct were intended by legislatures to enable
those wronged to recover for their harms. 100 Without such clear
legislative intent, claims can also be implied from the statutory
prohibitions, often where
( l) the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was
enacted; (2) the plaintiffs injury is one the statute was designed to prevent;
(3) a private right of action is consistent with the underlying purpose of the
statute; and (4) implying a private right of action is necessary to provide an
adequate remedy for violations of the statute. 101

insureds against insurers due to spoliation of evidence by insurers that is needed in
insureds' (product liability) claims against third parties).
100. See, e.g., Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283-84 (2002).
10 l. Metzger v. DaRosa, 805 N .E.2d 1165, 1168 (Ill. 2004). This is still good
Jaw in Illinois, as recognized in Alarm Detections Systems, Inc. v. Orland Fire
Protection District, 929 F.3d 865, 870 (7th Cir. 2019). See also Hardy v. Tournament
Players Club at Southwind, Inc., 513 S.W.3d 427, 435 (Tenn. 2017). Comparable
guidelines for implied federal claims were established in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78
(1975), whose analysis was altered as focus has now shifted primarily to legislative
intent. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988). For differing views on
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A medical records retention statute in Illinois is illustrative of a
written law on which a pre-suit evidence spoliation claim might be
based. 102 There, a hospital must retain an x-ray for at least five years,
and for up to twelve years if notified within five years that there is
pending litigation wherein the x-ray is "possible evidence." 103 Here,
unlike many written laws on evidence preservation, duties exist both
pre-suit and post-suit. 104 Seemingly, the Boyd precedent could support
a substantive law claim under this statute on behalf of one harmed in
civil litigation by a hospital's pre-suit failure to retain covered records.
Not unlike the Illinois statute is a California Government Code
provision on employment record retention. 105 It says:
It shall be an unlawful practice for employers, labor organizations, and
employment agencies subject to the provisions of this part to fail to maintain
and preserve any and all applications, personnel, membership, or
employment referral records and files for a minimum period of two years
after the records and files are initially created or received, or for employers
to fail to retain personnel files of applicants or terminated employees for a
minimum period of two years after the date of the employment action taken
.... Upon notice that a verified complaint against it has been filed under
this part, any such employer, labor organization, or employment agency
shall maintain and preserve any and all records and files until the complaint
is fully and finally disposed of and all appeals or related proceedings
terminated. 106

Another California statute is also comparable. 107 It says: "Audit
documentation shall be maintained for a minimum of seven years
which shall be extended during the pendency of any board

applying these (and other) guidelines on implied causes of action, see the varying
opinions in Gonzaga University, 536 U.S. at 280, 291-92.
102. See 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 90/1 (1975).
103. Id.; see also LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:2144(F)(l) ("Hospital records shall be
retained by hospitals ... for a minimum period often years from the date a patient is
discharged."); KAN. ADMIN. REGS.§ 100-24-l(a) (1998) (explaining a licensee's duty
to "maintain an adequate record for each patient for whom the licensee performs a
professional service"); Longwell v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. l, 970 So.
2d 1100, 1106 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that deliberate spoliation is needed to
support tort claim); Foster v. Lawrence Mem'l Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831, 838 (D. Kan.
1992) (employing KAN. ADMIN. REGS.§ 100-24-1 spoliation claim against doctor for
breach of regulatory duty).
104. See 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 90/1.
105. See CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 12946 (West 2013).
l 06. Id. This section is located within a title on state government addressing
prohibited discrimination.
107. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§ 5097 (West 2003).
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investigation, disciplinary action, or legal action involving the
licensee or the licensee's firm." 10s
Further, a federal regulation on public contract recordkeeping
says "any personnel or employment record made or kept by the
contractor shall be preserved by the contractor for a period of two
years." 109 It goes on:
Where the contractor has received notice that a complaint of discrimination
has been filed, that a compliance evaluation has been initiated, or that an
enforcement action has been commenced, the contractor shall preserve all
personnel records relevant . . . until final disposition . . . . The term
personnel records . . . would include, for example, personnel or
employment records relating to the aggrieved person and to all other
employees holding positions similar to that held or sought by the aggrieved
person, and application forms or test papers completed by an unsuccessful
applicant and by all other candidates for the same position as that for which
the aggrieved person applied and was rejected. 110

Here, as with the Illinois medical record statute, there are both pre-suit
and post-suit duties.
Another federal regulation, governing producers participating in
the Prune/Dried Plum Program of the Department of Agriculture, says
this:
The producers .. . must keep accurate records and accounts showing the
details relative to the prune/plum tree removal ... . Such records and
accounts must be retained for two years after the date of payment to the
producer under the program, or for two years after the date of any audit of
records by USDA, whichever is later. Any destruction of records by the
producer at any time will be at the risk of the producer when there is reason
to know, believe, or suspect that matters may be or could be in dispute or
remain in dispute. 111

There are criminal statutes on evidence preservation that may
also be employed by civil claimants to recover for harm caused by
evidence loss. In South Carolina, a statute addresses the duty of a
"custodian" to "preserve all physical evidence and biological material
related to the conviction or adjudication of a person" for certain
offenses, including murder, criminal sexual conduct, arson, and
certain sexual misconduct. 112 While this statute operates only after a

108. Id. This section is located within a division on professions and vocations
generally; this appears in the chapter on accountants.
109. Recordkeeping, 41 C.F.R. § 60-300.80(a) (2018).
110. Id.
111. See Records and Accounts, 7 C.F.R. § 81.13 (2018).
112. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-28-320(a)(1), (10), (14), (19) (2009).
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suit has resulted in a conviction or an adjudication, 113 it could be used
by one who is later exonerated and whose exoneration was (long)
delayed by a statutory violation because the non-preserved evidences
was not available for new testing methods which became available
post-conviction. 114

IV. COMMON ELEMENTS FOR PRE-SUIT EVIDENCE PRESERVATION
ORDERS

Civil procedure laws operating pre-suit that promote evidence
preservation should be expanded, via new written laws, in order to
promote enforcement of the current substantive laws and civil
procedure sanction laws on pre-suit evidence spoliation. As both the
substantive and procedural laws on evidence preservation now vary
widely between jurisdictions, 115 new written laws on pre-suit evidence
preservation orders should differ interstate and intrastate (i.e., between
federal and state courts). Yet all such laws should contain some
common elements. A discussion of such common elements follows.n 6
A. Situs
As to the situs of such new laws, they are best located within
amendments to existing written civil procedure laws on perpetuating
witness testimony via deposition. 117 The goals behind pre-suit
evidence preservation orders mirror the goals behind pre-suit
deposition orders to perpetuate testimony, in that both involve greater
assurance that information important for accurate fact-finding during
later hearings or trials in civil litigation will be available in order to
113. An adjudication without a conviction of certain covered offenses, like a
finding that a person is a "sexually violent predator," can be made, for example, in an
involuntary civil commitment proceeding. S.C. CODE ANN.§ 44-48-100 (2010).
114. Such a civil suit for harm caused by evidence loss may require proof of
willful and malicious conduct leading to evidence loss, as this mens rea is needed for
a criminal misdemeanor conviction. See S.C. CooEANN. § 17-28 -350 (2019).
115. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 30, at 57-59.
116. Our discussion is informed by Professor Spencer's suggested reforms of
FRCP 37. See Spencer, supra note 3, at 2022-33. It also is informed by Professor
Hoffman's "normative insights about safeguards" needed in expanded state pre-suit
discovery options. Hoffman, supra note 30, at 270-80. Professor Dodson urged a
possible FRCP 27 amendment (or a special statute) but left its elements "for another
day." Dodson, supra note 30, at 64.
117. Compare Spencer, supra note 3, at 2022-24 (suggesting placement
within general civil procedure rules on sanctioning discovery abuses), with Dodson,
supra note 30, at 64 (suggesting an amendment to FRCP 27).
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resolve disputed facts fairly. Unlike witness testimony perpetuation
orders, however, other pre-suit orders concerning evidence
preservation may also address the lack of a duty to preserve. For
example, this could occur when those who have been asked to preserve
evidence obtain judicial declarations that preservation is unnecessary
or not required because the relevance of the requested evidence to the
civil litigation is not shown or the financial burdens of preservation
(far) outweigh the anticipated benefits to later accurate fact-finding.
In the absence of such written amendments (or other new written
pre-suit evidence laws), many trial courts can issue pre-suit evidence
preservation orders founded on their inherent equitable judicial
powers. 118 Of course, inherent powers may be unavailable where
written laws foreclose such orders. 119
B. Petitioners and Respondents
1. Petitioners
As to the petitioners who are eligible for pre-suit evidence
preservation orders, Professor Spencer is correct that they should be
limited to those who are potential parties in later related civil
actions. 120 He is wrong about the requirement that petitioners "cannot
presently bring ... or cause ... to be brought" their actions or that
petitioners should be limited to forums within the judicial system
wherein the expected claims may later be filed. 121 Further, he is wrong
that a petitioner must always proceed only where "any expected
adverse party resides or may be found." 122 To facilitate convenience
for a respondent, a pre-suit evidence preservation proceeding should

118. See, e.g., Stokes v. 835 N. Washington St., LLC, 784 A.2d 1142, 1149
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (allowing pre-suit land inspection); see also Wofford v.
Ethyl Corp., 447 S.E.2d 187, 189 (S.C. 1994) (allowing inspection of employer's
plant, documents, and other tangible evidence relating to employee's injury and later
death).
119. Stokes, 784 A.2d at 1149 (explaining that no Maryland rules prohibit an
equitable bill of discovery directed at the inspection of land of a non party; such rules
"may well violate" the requesting party's "right[s] of access to the courts").
120. See Spencer, supra note 3, at 2023 (proposed FRCP 37(e)(A)(3)(i)). But
see Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Borgata Hotel Casino & Spa, 195 A.3d 538, 540 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2017) (discussing how the insurer of prospective defendant can
seek pre-suit discovery under N.J. Ct. R. 4: 11-1 ).
121. Spencer, supra note 3, at 2023.
122. Id.
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be available, at times, where the respondent, not then an expected
adverse party, resides or is involved in significant related acts. 123
Allowing pre-suit evidence preservation petitions even when
civil actions could be filed would serve several important purposes,
including allowing petitioners to be better assured that their pre-suit
"reasonable pre-filing inquiry" duties on claim preservations have
been met, 124 avoiding defenses to petitioners raising issues of current
ability to sue, and promoting more informed pre-suit settlements.
Allowing pre-suit petitions in judicial systems wherein later
related civil claims may not be filed preserves for petitioners their
right to choose forums. Further, they facilitate information gathering
and often convenience to respondents by allowing, for example,
requests in state courts in closer proximity to the evidence sought than
any federal courts, though later federal suits are contemplated, if not
required, by exclusive subject matter jurisdiction laws. 125 The
recognition of a broader array of potential witnesses and potential
venues for pre-suit preservation orders parallels the extensive forums
sometimes available for orders on pre-suit witness testimony
perpetuation via deposition. 126
2. Respondents
As to respondents, a broad range of people and entities should
be able to be ordered pre-suit to produce or to preserve evidence.
Professor Spencer is correct that information may be ordered from
persons, rather than just from an "expected adverse party" who, of
course, must be notified of pre-suit discovery requests involving
123. See id. Surely there are personal jurisdiction-like limits on securing
authority over both a respondent and an expected adverse party. These limits are less
significant in the Article III federal courts since national, rather than state, powers are
exercised. Article III court powers are sometimes available nationwide over U.S.
citizens, as in statutory interpleader under 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (where claimants "may
be found"). Article III court powers sometimes are available in more limited settings,
though still beyond state court powers, as with extraterritorial personal jurisdiction
over FRCP 14 third party defendants under FRCP 4(k)(l)(B) ("100 miles from where
the summons was issued").
124. Id. at 2020.
125. See id. at 2013.
126. For example, the federal rule on witness testimony perpetuation,
followed in several U.S. states, allows a petition to be filed in any community (i.e.,
under the FRCP in any district and under the Arkansas rule in any county) "where any
expected adverse party resides." FED. R. Crv. P. 27(a)(l); see also ARK. R. Crv. P.
27(a)(l).
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anyone. 127 There is no reason to think that pre-suit discovery is
generally more burdensome on respondents than post-suit discovery
wherein parties and nonparties alike can be summoned via
depositions. Of course, pre-suit discovery is necessarily somewhat
more speculative as there is no guarantee of a later related civil action.
So, respondents should be less available for pre-suit discovery than for
post-suit discovery. Greater limits should be set out in the new civil
procedure laws on the petition content requirements for those seeking
pre-suit evidence preservation orders.
We agree with the Texas Supreme Court that a Texas trial court
should not be able to authorize pre-suit discovery from "persons"
seeking to identify an "expected adverse party" where the court is
without personal jurisdiction over the anticipated party. 128 The Texas
Court concluded that a state trial court should not be turned into "the
world's inspector general." 129 We acknowledge that some focus should
be on the authority over the "persons" from whom discovery is sought.
We also understand that post-suit depositions can occur in Texas
involving lawsuits already pending elsewhere. But there, some court
has found authority over a party who may be affected by the discovery.
While pre-suit Texas discovery devices should not be available to
assist some seeking information on reasonably anticipated claims
without such authority being . first established, those seeking
information can utilize fact-gathering devices outside the discovery
rules.
C. Petition Contents

Petitions seeking pre-suit evidence preservation orders, given
their pleas for extraordinary relief involving discovery disclosures,
should be quite detailed, as well as certified and verified by lawyers
and their clients. Lawyers should certify reasonable inquiry, which
might include meet and confer and proportionality requirements. Their
clients should verify the factual circumstances prompting their need
127. See Spencer, supra note 3, at 2023 (proposed FRCP 37(e)(3)(A)); see
also Hoffman, supra note 30, at 270-72 (describing the need in Texas for an express

requirement of such notice).
128. In re Doe, 444 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Tex. 2014) ("If a Rule 202 court need
not have personal jurisdiction over a potential defendant, the rule could be used by
anyone in the world to investigate anyone else in the world against whom suit could
be brought .... The reach of the court's power to compel testimony would be limited
only by its grasp over witnesses.").
129. Id. at 61 l.
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for judicial assistance. Such requirements would be similar to the
usual dictates on those-including lawyers and their clients-who file
complaints or who seek provisional remedies. 130
In his FRCP 37(e) proposal, Professor Spencer urged that a
petition should only be pursued by one expecting to be a party in a
civil action "cognizable in a United States court" who "cannot
presently bring it or cause it to be brought. " 131 We think that petitioners
should sometimes be able to proceed even where any future claim may
not, or even likely will not, be brought. Pre-suit settlements founded
on accurate factual assessments should be encouraged. Federal and
state civil procedure laws on evidence preservation via a pre-suit
deposition to perpetuate testimony have no requirements on the
current inability to bring a civil action or cause a civil action to be
brought. 132
Professor Spencer was right in arguing that a petition should
contain "the subject matter of the expected action and the petitioner's
interest;" the facts a petitioner wishes to establish through use of the
preserved material; and the expected adverse party or parties in the
expected action, "so far as known." 133
Professor Lonny S. Hoffman rightly argued pre-suit discovery
should only be permitted where the "information ... cannot otherwise
be obtained." 134 Judicial oversight, as well as reasonable inquiry and
proportionality limits, will prompt pre-suit discoverers to engage in
more efficient information gathering techniques. 135 Our concern with
Professor Hoffman's limit is that there may be availability of the
information, but the nondiscovery avenue is quite costly, burdensome,
and time consuming compared to the pre-suit discovery avenue. We
recognize that others favor a more limited scope for pre-suit discovery,
130. See FED. R. Civ. P. l l(b)(2) (asserting that lawyers must certify that
"legal contentions are warranted by existing law" or by a non-frivolous argument for
a change in the law); FED. R. Crv. P. 1 l(c)(l) (stating that parties responsible for Rule
11 violations, typically involving factual contentions without evidentiary support, per
FRCP 1 l(b)(3), may be sanctioned); FED. R. Crv. P. 65 (explaining that requests for
temporary restraining orders must be supported by "specific facts in an affidavit or a
verified complaint clearly" showing the need for immediate relief).
131. Spencer, supra note 3, at 2023 (providing proposed FRCP
37(e)(3)(A)(i)).
132. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 27(a)(l); see also MONT. CODE ANN.§ 25-2027(a)(l) (2017).
133. Spencer, supra note 3, at 2023-24 (proposing FED. R. Civ. P.
37(e)(3)(A)(ii)-(iv)).
134. Hoffman, supra note 30, at 274-75.
135. See id. at272-74.
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as with testimony or evidence that could be lost or destroyed before
suit is filed. 136
As to verification, the person or entity petitioning for a
preservation order should verify certain facts expressly on the
condition that a sanction may follow if verification is found to have
been undertaken without reasonable inquiry, without a good factual
basis, or with an improper purpose. Professor Spencer also urges there
be "a verified petition." 137 The Illinois court rule on an independent
action before suit to identify those who may be "responsible in
damages" requires a verified petition containing the necessity of the
discovery and the nature of the discovery sought. 138
Some individual or entity liability for sanctions upon verification
failures by agents should also be expressly recognized in a new written
pre-suit evidence preservation law so that lawyers and judges are
informed of the consequences of failures of verification. 139
As to certification, the lawyer pursuing a client's pre-suit
evidence preservation request should certify certain circumstances on
the condition that a sanction may follow if certification is found
deficient. Pre-suit discovery should not be undertaken by a lawyer on
a client's behalf without reasonable inquiry, 140 without a good legal
basis, or with an improper purpose by a lawyer's client or by a lawyer
(including promoting such a purpose on behalf of a client). 141 Again,

136. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. v. Borgata Hotel Casino & Spa, 195 A.3d 538,
541 (N.J. 2017) (discussing N.J. CT. R. 4: 11-1, which covers testimony perpetuation,
evidence preservation, and document or property inspection).
137. Spencer, supra note 3, at 2023 (proposing FED. R. Crv. P. 37(e)(3)(A)).
138. Compare ILL. SUP. CT. R. 224(a)(l)(i)-(ii), with 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.§
5/2-402 (2006) (stating there is no verification when discovery sought from
respondents in discovery in a pending civil action).
139. Liability for all agent actions is not needed. Compare this idea to FRCP
11 on law firm liability for only some pleading failures by their attorneys. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 11. For example, entity liability should arise when an agent's failure was
caused, wholly or in significant part, by the entity's deficient system on litigation
holds. But no entity liability should be grounded on an agent's purposeful evidence
destruction solely geared to shielding the agent from liability to the entity or a third
party.
140. Professor Hoffman urges that for pre-suit discovery, there need be "a
reasonable probability ... that the discovery sought will result in a viable claim" (or,
for us, a defense) and "a good-faith basis for believing" important facts will be
unearthed. Hoffman, supra note 30, at 275-76.
141. A client's improper purpose, for example, may be apparent to the lawyer
during the client's initial solicitation of the lawyer's help, where the attorney-client
communication privilege would not operate, as with the crime-fraud exception.
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there should be available individual or entity liability for sanctions
arising from failures of attorney certifications.
D. Proportionality
As with many post-suit discovery requests or orders, a pre-suit
evidence preservation request or order should only be made after a
determination on appropriate proportionality by both the petitioner
and the trial judge. 142 For post-suit discovery in a federal district court,
one presenting a discovery request must certify that the request is
"neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive,
considering the needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the
amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the
action." 143 In ruling upon such a presentation a district judge must
consider whether the request is
proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the
issues at stake[,] ... the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access
to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit[s].1 44

Clearly, these proportionality assessments will differ for the
same requested information in pre-suit and post-suit settings. Given
the more speculative nature of the need for the information,
proportionality relating to pre-suit requests will be inherently more
difficult to demonstrate. We do not, however, think that an irreparable
harm standard is necessary before pre-suit discovery is permitted. Presuit factual inquiry duties for prospective civil litigants and others
must always be undertaken reasonably; they need not be limited to
exceptional circumstances. The aforenoted pre-suit witness testimony
perpetuation norms, as well as party and claim identification discovery
norms, carry no irreparable harm or exceptional circumstance
standard.
Access to justice should not be inhibited by pre-suit roadblocks
to accessing information unsupported by legitimate public policies,
especially when they are erected by those seeking to avoid the legal
responsibilities prompted by their own actions. While in civil
litigation there is generally no privilege against self-incrimination, that
142. Explicit requirements on proportionality assessments for post-suit
discovery requests sometimes are only recognized for the trial judges. See, e.g., ILL.
SUP. CT. R. 20l(c)(3).
143. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(l)(B)(iii).
144. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(l).
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privilege may be employed where there remains potential criminal
litigation. Thus, judicial assessments of pre-suit discovery requests
will differ for requests directed at potential defendants and for requests
directed at nonparty witnesses.
E. Meet and Confer
Pre-suit evidence preservation petitions, outside of witness
testimony perpetuation via deposition, should normally be required to
be preceded by "meet and confer" encounters between potential
petitioners and respondents wherein any concerns are aired and
perhaps resolved. Therein, reasonable efforts should be made to agree
on information access. 145 Such compelled encounters are
commonplace in federal and state civil procedure laws when post-suit
disputes arise regarding discovery. 146 They also track the many
procedural laws on the need to meet and confer before post-suit
discovery begins so that a discovery plan can be formulated. 147
Following post-suit discovery laws, pre-suit evidence
preservation petitions should also be noticed to, and afford conferral
opportunities for, later potential parties who are not respondents. 148

145. This requirement attends the Ohio rule on identifying potential
defendants before suit. See Omo R. Civ. P. 34(D)(3)(c).
146. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 26(c)(l) (explaining that parties must make a
good faith effort to resolve discovery disputes before a motion for a protective order
may be filed). Similar state civil procedure laws include ILL. SUP. CT. R. 20l(k), ARK.
R. C1v. P. 26(c), and W. VA. R. C1v. P. 26(c). Local court rules sometimes extend such
dispute resolution obligations following private meet and confers which do not resolve
discovery disputes. See, e.g., S.D. IND. R. 37-1 (a) (explaining that before district judge
involvement in a "formal discovery motion," counsel must confer with "assigned
Magistrate Judge" in order to see if dispute resolution is possible).
147. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (requiring good faith effort to formulate
discovery plan); see also FED. R. C1v. P. 26(d)(l) (explaining that there can be no
discovery until conferral required by FRCP 26(f) on discovery plan). Similar state
civil procedure laws include MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.06(b), IOWA R. Civ. P 1.507, and
ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26(f). See also N.D. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (explaining that a discovery
planning meeting is required upon request by one party); N.C. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (stating
similar).
148. Professor Hoffman found in Texas that a lack of an express notice
requirement covering future litigants led to instances of no notice given, prompting
changes to the Texas pre-suit discovery rule. See Hoffman, supra note 30, at 270-72.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3350654

682

Michigan State Law Review

2019

F. Available Forms of Relief
Pre-suit evidence preservation orders should, at times, prompt
information disclosures to petitioners together with information
preservations by respondents. 149 So, sometimes copies of documents
will be ordered to be revealed to petitioners while the originals will be
ordered to be preserved by the respondents.
Pre-suit evidence preservation orders may also, at times, prompt
disclosures necessitating evidence destruction. For example, a
machine involved in an accident might be ordered tested even if the
testing will result in complete destruction, or permanent alteration, of
the machine. Of course, all reasonably foreseeable parties to future
litigation involving the machine should have opportunities to test or to
observe testing.
Pre-suit preservation orders might prompt evidence preservation
by a respondent though there is then no disclosure to a petitioner and
no evidence destruction. For example, a preservation, but no
disclosure, order could allow for a later determination of a privilege
claim when the relevance or need for the preserved nondisclosed
evidence can be more reasonably assessed.
Finally, available forms of relief should include protective
orders. Thus, at least some who receive pre-suit evidence preservation
demand letters should have standing to seek declaratory relief on
whether or not there is a preservation duty and, if so, what the
parameters are of such a duty. Standing is easily justified in settings
where the evidence in question is key to reasonably anticipated
litigation; where the facts are chiefly, if not wholly, undisputed; and
where the legal issue of duty is said to arise from an explicit statute or
from an express contract whose validity cannot be reasonably
disputed.
G. Cost Shifting and Sanctions
The costs of compliance with pre-suit evidence preservation
orders directing that certain evidence be disclosed to the petitioner, or
preserved by the respondent, should be similarly shifted from the
respondent to the petitioner as are compliance costs for comparable
post-suit discovery orders. 150 This approach provides little incentive to
149. Hoffman's article provides more on the general need for judicial
oversight of pre-suit discovery. See id. at 272-74.
150. Compare 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/1-101 (2019) (stating that respondent
in discovery is "paid expenses and fees provided for witnesses"), with ILL. SUP. Cr. R.
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accelerate discovery before suit. Moreover, cost shifting arising from
sanctions founded on pre-suit discovery law failures should be
available.
Sanctions for pre-suit discovery violations should be available
and track the sanctions available for similar (or somewhat similar)
post-suit discovery violations. 151 Of course, there will be no perfect
overlap. For example, sanctions involving future jury instructions
would generally be out of place in pre-suit discovery settings. 152
Vexing choice-of-law issues might arise where pre-suit
discovery violations involving pre-suit evidence preservation orders
surface in later, related civil actions. Federal district courts already
struggle with whose spoliation sanction laws govern when diversity or
supplemental claims are involved, with most courts ultimately
applying federal civil procedure laws. 153 Where there are findings in
later, related federal civil actions that earlier state court evidence
preservation orders were violated, even thornier questions arise. While
possible, it seems inefficient for the federal courts to refer those
violations back to the state courts whose orders were violated. When
the violations are addressed in the federal courts, should it matter for
choice of discovery sanction law purposes that the violations occurred
before the federal actions were commenced? And should state
discovery sanction laws for violations of pre-suit state court
preservation orders ever be applied in federal courts even where the
pending claims in federal court only involve federal substantive laws?

224(c) (stating that "reasonable expenses of complying" with pre-suit discovery
requests designed to identify those responsible for damages "shall be borne" by the
independent action petitioner seeking discovery).
151. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 224(b) (explaining that sanctions available for
post-suit discovery violations "may be utilized by a party initiating" an independent
action for pre-suit discovery or by a respondent in such an action).
152. However, in pre-suit settings future jury instructions should be addressed
where the relevant law on evidence preservation expressly addresses future jury
instructions when the law is violated. See, e.g., Recordkeeping, 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 .80
(2014) (covering a contractor's duty to preserve certain personnel and employment
records; presumption that records were unfavorable to the party failing to preserve
arises, but not where a failure resulted from circumstances outside the control of the
party).
153 . See, e.g., Sherman v. Rinchem Co., 687 F.3d 996, 1006 (8th Cir. 2012);
see also Condrey v. SunTrust Bank of Ga., 431 F.3d 191, 203 (5th Cir. 2005)
(applying federal evidentiary rules rather than state spoliation laws in diversity suits).
But see Reilly v. Natwest Mkts. Grp. Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 267 (2d Cir. 1999); Keller v.
United States, 58 F.3d 1194, 1197- 98 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting the split in federal
courts).
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Sanction requests for pre-suit evidence preservation failures surely
will sometimes present challenges in later civil litigation.
H. Appeals
As there are no claims in the traditional sense, in pre-suit
evidence preservation proceedings any appeals cannot be grounded on
a final judgment rule or on related doctrines. Appellate standards
should be comparable to the standards for interlocutory reviews of
formal discovery orders. 154 Discretionary assessments by either or both
trial and intermediate appellate court judges seem warranted. Trial
judges should assess, at times, the impact on the parties of their orders
about any evidence disclosure as well as the significance of the legal
issues, especially questions of privileged communications, work
product, and other public-policy based immunities from compelled
involuntary disclosure. Similarly, discretionary assessments by
appellate justices should be the norm. Sometimes, appeals of pre-suit
discovery orders would constitute "friendly contempt" proceedings.

I. Later Effects
As noted, because pre-suit discovery is more speculative
regarding actual disputes than post-suit discovery, denials of pre-suit
evidence preservation petitions should not foreclose similar discovery
requests post-suit. Further, grants of pre-suit evidence preservation
petitions should not foreclose similar discovery requests post-suit
since new information may have been created or old information may
have become unreliable. The general duty to supplement earlier postsuit discovery responses should not attend pre-suit discovery
responses, though certain exceptions do seem worthwhile. 155
154. These standards vary in American appellate courts, as with mandamus
petitions, as in In re Hewlett Packard, 212 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Tex. App. 2006), and
with interlocutory appeals of injunctions, as in Zitella v. Mike's Transportation, LLC,
99 N.E.3d 535, 539-40 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) (differentiating between non-appealable
discovery orders).
155. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(e)(l)(A) (learning earlier disclosure or response is
"incomplete or incorrect"). Notwithstanding the absence of a general duty to
supplement, pre-suit discovery respondents should have the means to correct or
supplement their earlier responses. As well, pre-suit evidence preservation orders
should be able to include special duties to supplement as where respondents agree that
significant new information will be provided. Consider, for example, a general duty
to supplement a pre-suit discovery response when the respondent should have known
an earlier response was founded on lies that were only recently uncovered.
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CONCLUSION

New civil procedure laws should, at the least, authorize pre-suit
court orders involving evidence preservation when the evidence,
relevant to possible civil litigation, will likely spoil otherwise and is
subject to a preservation duty under substantive law. 156 These new
laws should originate in amendments to the written civil procedure
laws on witness testimony perpetuation via deposition. 157 New laws
should authorize both pre-suit discovery and pre-suit orders declaring
a lack of any preservation duty where a pre-suit evidence preservation
demand has been made, is disputed, and warrants immediate judicial
attention. The availability of more expansive pre-suit evidence
preservation orders will promote greater unifonnity among the trial
courts within a particular judicial system, prompt more infonned
settlement talks, and enhance accuracy in later litigation factfinding.

156. See, e.g., id.
157. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 766.106(6)(a) (2013) (noting that pre-suit civil
discovery laws originate in varying sources, including court rules, statutes, and case
precedents).
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